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GAMBLING WITH GLOBALISM:
JAPANESE FINANCIAL FLOWS TO NORTH KOREA AND THE SANCTIONS POLICY OPTION
By Jenny Lind
The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) offers a solution for the North Korean nuclear
crisis, yet many problems may stand in the way of its success. If the agreement
breaks down, for whatever reason, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have
indicated they will press for economic sanctions against the DPRK. Sanctions
enacted by the United Nations Security Council would be the most effective, as they
would combine the sanctity of international consensus with the sting of China's
economic leverage over Pyongyang. China supplies the DPRK with most of its food
and oil: a vital link given recent shortages reported in both.1 However, it is
doubtful that China would cooperate in a sanctions effort against its ally. A Chinese
veto in the Security Council would prevent the enactment of UN sanctions, and a
Chinese abstention would raise issues of sanctions enforcement. 2
Given the difficulty of enacting sanctions against the DPRK in the Security
Council, the U.S. has considered sanctions outside the UN. After Pyongyang's
announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in June 1994, the
Clinton Administration considered a trilateral sanctions package against the DPRK,
along with Japan and the ROK. Such a policy was reconsidered in April 1995, when
Pyongyang was refusing to accept the ROK as the supplier of the light water reactors
promised by the Framework. A discussion of sanctions is likely to resurface again in
the event of future problems with the Agreed Framework. In such trilateral
sanctions, Japan's role is key.
Next to China, Japan is the DPRK's most vital economic link. Money flows
from Japan's ethnic Korean community to the DPRK, a cash flow comprising
Pyongyang's only source of hard currency aside from exports. In this paper I
examine Japan's role in sanctions measures that would include severing this cash
flow. What kind of economic leverage does Tokyo wield over Pyongyang, and
would it be willing to use it? I will argue that Japanese financial flows are vital to
the North Korean economy; their severance would be an essential component of
sanctions against the DPRK. However, I find that although Japan would face
significant American pressure to participate in a trilateral sanctions regime, it is
unlikely to join in sanctions outside UN auspices. Japan's cooperation, however, is
important given its aspirations as an international leader. Thus I find Tokyo likely
to press as hard as possible to keep the issue in the realm of the Security Council,
where Japan's reluctance to participate in sanctions would be overshadowed by
China's.
JAPAN'S LEVERAGE
Money flows to the DPRK from Japan's community of Korean residents,
which numbers about 700,000 people3 (descendants of those Koreans who were
brought to Japan for slave labor during the colonial period of 1910-45). An estimated
one in three Koreans living in Japan has relatives in the DPRK; those in Japan send
1
their relatives money. 4 A variety of explanations exist for why they do so:
according to the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, Chosensoren,5 it
is a simple matter of richer relatives in Japan giving a bit of money to help poorer
relatives in the DPRK. Chosensoren says these are personal transactions, and claim
the amounts are negligible. 6 Some report a darker motive for the cash flow,
suggesting that the money is extorted by the North Korean government.
The people who moved to North Korea, and their families who stayed
behind, became hostages. Fearing for their relatives' safety, those living in
Japan had to keep quiet about the existence of the hostages. To extract
financial contributions from those living in Japan, their relatives are
threatened. 7
The New York Times quotes a Korean resident of Japan: "Our relatives are
hostages...We are sending money in hopes that our relatives will not starve, and
that they will not be killed." 8
Others claim that Chosensoren raises funds in Japan on behalf of the North
Korean government.
In order to hold large events (such as celebrations for Kim Il Sung's birthday,
National Independence Day, and international festivals), large amounts of
money are required. For Kim I Sung's 70th birthday in 1982, Chosensoren
collected and sent 5 billion yen [$50 million] from Japan. Twenty-one
individual businessmen who had each donated over 100 million yen were
awarded Patriotic Socialist medals in the name of Kim Il Sung.9
According to another source in the Japanese government, Chosensoren transferred
$34 million in pachinko cash on that occasion. 0 The pachinko industry is rumored
to be Chosensoren's most lucrative source of donations to Pyongyang.ll In Japan,
traditional career routes are often denied to those of Korean ancestry, due to
lingering legal and social discrimination; thus they often turn entrepreneurial, and
have been very successful in the pachinko gambling business. Sixty percent of
pachinko parlor owners are ethnic Koreans, in a booming industry that in 1993
reported aggregate sales of $175 billion. 12 Some say that pachinko parlor owners
are "regularly 'taxed' by North Korea to provide funds for Pyongyang
festivities.... "1 3Chosensoren denies that it serves as a link between the pachinko
industry and the DPRK. 14
Money is sent from Japan to Korea in two ways: either hand-carried or by
bank wire transfer. Most Japanese banks cut their ties to Pyongyang after it
defaulted on loans during the 1970's, and more recently on $660 million in Japanese
loans in 1984.15 However, "there are 18 banks in Japan authorized to deal with the
North, and Japanese officials say they have no idea how much flows through third
countries."16
The Mangyongbong 92 ferry that sails three times a month from Niigata,
Japan to the DPRK allows visitors to personally deliver money. This ferry carries
an annual total of about 15,000 passengers, 17 including business people, students,
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and people visiting their families. But lax customs restrictions on this route allow
for the possibility that more than duty-free cognacs exist among the passengers' gifts
to North Koreans. 18
American and Japanese intelligence officials assert that the Mangyongbong's
cargo includes everything North Korea's leaders most treasure: millions of
yen in hard currency, equipment and spare parts...and off-the-shelf
technology to sustain what has become the world's least-secret covert nuclear
arms project. 19
Currently, individual visitors from Japan can take as much as five million yen
(about $50,000) to the DPRK without a declaration, with unrestricted amounts of
foreign currency and traveler's checks. 'Suitcase remittances' thus allow the DPRK
easy access to hard currency.2 0
The amount of money sent every year from Japan to the DPRK, for whatever
purpose, is the subject of much debate. Comprised of personal cash deliveries and
bank wires (both from Japan and from third countries) the figure is extremely
difficult to quantify, and easy to exaggerate in either direction. Gendai Korea, a
research institute in Tokyo, released an estimate in 1990 at $600 million; three years
later it reported that this estimate was too low, and $2 billion was more accurate. 21
The institute's director, Katsumi Sato -- a former member of Chosensoren --
estimates that about $300,000 per passenger is delivered to people in the DPRK.22 On
the other extreme is Chosensoren, which claims the only cash flow is that small
amount of money flowing between relatives, and that Sato's estimates are absurd.
The number of people who take that kind of money with them when they
travel overseas is very few. This total also includes small children, students,
and elderly people, which isn't realistic. We just can't believe these figures.
People in Japan on a anti-North Korean campaign put out this propaganda
and it gets spread by the media.23
Pyongyang also dismisses the estimates of the cash flow as totally inaccurate.
Japanese reactionaries and their subsidized media are circulating the fiction of
outflow of money from... (Chongryon) to the DPRK and are hysterically
crying that it must be checked....The DPRK has owed nothing to Japan up
until now. It has lived and can live without Japan's help, and is able to live
by its own efforts.24
The most commonly cited estimate of the money flow is about $600 million
per year,25 which would comprise about 3% of the DPRK's GDP of $22 billion.2 6
This cash flow represents the DPRK's major source of hard currency other than
exports; loans will be impossible to obtain given Pyongyang's former defaults, and
its external debt estimated at $8 billion.2 7 Despite Pyongyang's denials, without this
cash flow, the DPRK would lose one of its few sources of hard currency, and its ties
to a $175 billion gaming industry. Japanese sanctions are indeed a potentially
3
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powerful source of leverage over Pyongyang.
This being the case, should the U.S. decide to pressure Pyongyang with
sanctions measures, Japanese participation would be essential. Would Tokyo be
willing to use the influence it wields?
JAPAN'S CASE FOR SANCTIONS: LOOKING OUTWARD
First I shall examine the case for sanctions. Japan has an obvious interest in
preventing any country in Asia from acquiring a nuclear arsenal. At the very least,
it would destabilize the region; at worst, it could threaten Japan directly, given that
Japan is within striking distance of the DPRK's Rodong missiles. In an examination
of security threats, the Japan Defense Agency's 1995 White Paper identified the
DPRK as the number-one threat to Japan's security. It cites North Korean
development of nuclear weapons as "not only a problem affecting Japanese security
but also a grave problem for international society from the viewpoint of the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." 2 8 Moreover, the thought of a
nuclear DPRK is all the more disturbing to Japan in view of Pyongyang's vocal,
bitter propaganda against its former colonial masters. Thus given the renewal of a
nuclear threat that would result from a failure of the Agreed Framework, a
successful sanctions policy would be highly desirable.
Theories of cooperation tell us that the most preferable outcome for any
country in such a situation is to do nothing while other countries solve the
problem. 2 9 Such behavior is problematic for Japan for two reasons. First, given the
significance of Japan's participation in a sanctions regime, it is unlikely that a
regime enacted without it could exert much pressure on the DPRK. Second, it
would exacerbate Japan's reputation as an international free-rider that has taken
more than it has given to the postwar international community. Japan's hesitant
"checkbook diplomacy" has resulted in criticism from other countries. Thus Tokyo
senses pressure not only to adopt recommended sanctions, but to take a proactive
role in solving any Asian regional crises.
... Japan's response to the Gulf crisis, exhibiting its familiar clumsiness of
being "too little, too late", confirmed the image of Japan as a distinct
international anomaly -- an economic great power without commensurate
military power and policy leadership.30
Japan's participation in collective security activities such as sanctions measures
would bolster its image as a diplomatic player. Its success in seeking a seat on the
United Nations Security Council will be influenced by its actions in international
dilemmas such as these. During the 1994 crisis after the DPRK announced its
withdrawal from the NPT, it was noted that "...Tokyo's handling of the crisis is
widely regarded as the greatest test of its ability to take a leading role in regional
security." 31 Perception of threat and international obligations thus would spur
Japan to approve sanctions against the DPRK.
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JAPAN'S CASE AGAINST SANCTIONS: LOOKING INWARD
Despite these important incentives for Japan to participate in sanctions, there
are significant reasons why sanctions are unlikely to be applied outside the UN
framework.
1. Terrorist Reprisals
The DPRK is notorious for its proven willingness to use terrorism as a tool of
state policy. Though there has not been a recent incident, the 1983 bombing of the
South Korean cabinet, the 1988 downing of the KAL airliner, and repeated
assassination attempts against South Korean presidents prove that Pyongyang is
quite willing to resort to terrorism if it feels that other policy instruments have not
produced the desired results. Moreover, Kim Jong Il, said to have masterminded
many of these infamous events, is now the DPRK's leader.
The Japanese government estimates about 600 North Korean agents live in
Japan, "who could launch terrorist attacks if Pyongyang is hit by sanctions over its
nuclear row."32 They claim the professional agents coerce Korean residents in
Japan to assist them by threatening the lives of their relatives back in the DPRK.
"Holding their relatives as virtual hostages, the professionals could oblige the
resident to do their bidding." 33
Indeed, the DPRK made no mystery of its reaction to Japanese participation in
any sanctions effort. Pyongyang stated that sanctions would be regarded "as a
declaration of war, and Japan would be unable to evade a deserving punishment for
it.... This is an open revelation of Japan's will to involve itself in another war of
aggression on Korea."3 4 Tokyo has thus been warned to expect some form of
violent reprisal.
Japanese financial flows to the DPRK can also be looked upon as a safeguard.
While they continue, Japan is a vital link to the North Korean economy; their
cessation, however, is another matter. "Many see the hard-currency channel to
Pyongyang as an insurance policy against North Korean hostility." In other words,
Pyongyang would be hesitant to "kill the goose that lays the golden eggs." 35 Given
the DPRK's history of violence, given its recent rhetoric, Japan's hesitance to adopt
sanctions is predictable.
2. Interest in Pyongyang's Regime Maintenance
Some point out that Japan has an interest in delaying Korean unification.
Chung-in Moon writes: "Japan does not simply oppose, but [is] fearful of, a
reunified Korea. A delicate synergy of historical distrust, guilt about its militaristic
past and concern about possible future relations, all feed Japan's distrust of Korea." 3 6
David Arase agrees with Moon's view: "Whether reunification occurred quickly
through conflict, or slowly through absorption, Japan would still face the long-term
problem of a heavily armed, reunified Korean nation that has historic as well as
current economic grievances to settle with Japan."3 7 Tokyo denies that such a
motive drives its policy making.
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Many Korean people say that Japan opposes Korean unification, but this is
not true. Unification has been essential since the US-Japan security treaty was
signed in 1960. A war in the Korean peninsula would threaten Japan's
security. A unified Korean peninsula will never threaten Japan, unless it has
a Communist government. A unified Korea would allow Japan and Korea to
share peaceful prosperity. 38
Although Tokyo's true views on Korean unification are mixed, the
government is very likely to oppose any policy that would cause unification by
sudden regime collapse in the DPRK. Whether or not sanctions would have this
effect is difficult to predict. Five years of economic sanctions against Iraq have not
succeeded in ousting Saddam Hussein from power. Yet given the DPRK's uncertain
state, Tokyo would prefer to avoid a policy that might contribute to collapse of its
government, and the resulting refugee exodus and regional destabilization that
would ensue. Masao Okonogi notes, "While the majority of refugees would head
for China or South Korea, the nearly 100,000 persons (North Korean residents and
Japan and their Japanese wives) that returned to North Korea from Japan in the
1960's still have family in Japan." 3 9 Tokyo's fear that sanctions may lead to a regime
collapse may keep Japan from participating.
3. Human Rights Issues
In the debate over sanctions, Japan's government has noted the delicacy with
which it feels it must approach the issue. With a history of colonialism in Korea,
and a history of militarism there and elsewhere, Japan would prefer to forget its
past. Recent debates on reparations to Korean women who were sex slaves to the
Japanese army during World War II, and lingering discrimination against Koreans
in Japan are preventing Japan's past from slipping into historic obscurity. The
DPRK does not hesitate to bring up the past, as reflected by a statement after the
announcement of Japanese support for UN sanctions in 1994: "The entire Korean
people can hardly repress resentment at the fact that Japan...is still suppressing and
persecuting by means of [the] strong arm Koreans in Japan." 40
Although stopping the Mangyongbong ferry from sailing would be a simple
and effective means of cutting a large portion of the cash flow, it would limit the
personal freedom of a distinct group of people, namely ethnic Koreans. As a
Chosensoren spokesperson stated after a sanctions proposal, "Restrictions on cash
remittances and travel by Koreans between Japan and North Korea would raise a
grave human rights issue."41
While aware of the effect on its own Korean population, Japanese officials
also express concern about the effects of sanctions on the North Korean people.
"We look at funds different than the United States does. They see this money as
something that props up the North Korean government. We see it as largely
something from Koreans in Japan to help their families."42 Justification for this
view is solid. "A major problem with imposing sanctions on authoritarian regimes
is that the greatest pain is imposed on those who have least power." 4 3 Thus in the
6
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interest of human rights -- towards a people Japan has a history of oppressing --
participation in sanctions would be undesirable.
4. Domestic Politics
Many Japanese people are aware of the cash flow from Japan to the DPRK, yet
few people would consider it a significant political issue. After Japan announced its
willingness to participate in UN sanctions in June 1994, there was little protest.
Declining support for Chosensoren, and the fact that second- and third-generation
Koreans are less interested in such issues, are said to be responsible.4 4 Japan's
politicians, then, are not under significant pressure from voters in regards to their
policy making towards the DPRK.
An examination of Japan's political parties and their past connections with
the DPRK illuminates further problems with Japanese participation in a sanctions
regime. Japan is led by a coalition government comprised of the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), and the New Harbinger
Party (Sakigake). At first glance, we would expect a split within this ideologically
peculiar alliance. The SDPJ has a long history of support for the North Korean
regime, and has been "an effective mouthpiece for North Korean policy in Japan,
echoing the North Korean view in the Japanese political process. [SDPJ] leaders
have frequented North Korea as intermediaries between Tokyo and Pyongyang...."45
On the other hand, the foreign policy of the LDP is based on traditional, if hesitant,
compliance with U.S. and international efforts. Thus one would at first predict that
the LDP would be amenable to sanctions, and that policy making would revolve
around the inevitable conflict with the DSPJ on the issue.
The actual interests of both major parties are not as divergent on the issue of
the DPRK as one might expect. This can be seen in the 1989 pachinko money
scandal. After the LDP lost badly in upper-house elections that year, it attacked the
DSPJ's clean-cut image, taking up charges documented in the weekly magazine
Shukan Bunshun . These charges alleged that the DSPJ accepted donations from
Chosensoren, which are illegal under laws that prohibit contributions from
foreigners. Bunshun also alleged that the DSPJ lobbied against legislation that
would crack down on pachinko parlor tax evasion. The magazine claimed that such
evasion (estimated at 2 trillion yen, or U.S. $14 billion)4 6 allowed pachinko owners
to send profits to the DPRK.
This scandal illuminated that not only the DSPJ, but also the LDP has ties to
Chosensoren. When the LDP charged that the DSPJ had received 8 million yen in
political contributions from Chosensoren, it quietly dropped the issue after
investigations revealed that the LDP had actually accepted 118 million yen of such
contributions since 1972. 47 The LDP's Shin Kanemaru, Japan's most influential
"powerbroker" before his resignation due to financial scandal, "was a strong
supporter of North Korea and reportedly pushed for trade and diplomatic deals
favorable to Kim [I1 Sung]. Kanemaru was widely reported to have received
extensive financial contributions from Kim [Il Sung]." 48
Evidence of Kanemaru's bias can be seen in his leadership of a 1990 mission
to the DPRK; under his direction the mission signed a declaration in which Japan
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agreed to pay the DPRK reparations for Japan's colonial occupation, and for postwar
damages.
When the news broke, it created a furor at home and abroad over what was
considered a diplomatic blunder....If Japan extended the scope of
compensation from the period of colonial rule to the postwar period, all peace
treaties signed with other countries after the war, including the Japan-South
Korea peace treaty, would become invalid."49
Aside from the LDP, the Sakigake party (a small splinter group of the LDP and
the other party of the coalition) has also been linked to Pyongyang. Party leader
Masayoshi Takemura "developed friendly ties while governor of Shiba
prefecture," 5 0 and participated in Kanemaru's 1990 mission while a member of the
LDP. Thus, although the centrist/socialist split would appear to be the force behind
Japanese policy making in regards to the DPRK, all three parties have personal ties
to the regime. Provoking Chosensoren could lead it to reveal potentially
embarrassing information about its relationship to the ruling parties. Thus
sanctions against the DPRK would be politically difficult.
CONCLUSION
During the NPT crisis in June 1994, after long debate on the sanctions issue,
Japan's Foreign Ministry spokesman Terusuke Terada said, "we have to accept
measures adopted by the Security Council and we will implement them."51 He did
not elaborate to explain what Tokyo would do should the U.S. request Japanese
participation in sanctions outside the UN framework. But at that time, powerful
Japanese politician Ichiro Ozawa said, "If asked by the U.S. to join sanctions without
a UN resolution, I am very worried" about whether Japan could enforce the
measures. 52
For the reasons outlined earlier, Japan would find it very difficult to support
sanctions enacted outside the UN. The damage to relations with the DPRK, to the
rights of its own ethnic Korean population, and to its international image would
not merit its participation. However, given its Security Council ambitions, Japan
would be unwilling to give the impression to the U.S. and others that domestic
political and social issues interfere with its ability to act as a decisive international
leader.
Thus Tokyo's best strategy is to keep the sanctions debate within the UN
arena. UN sanctions would be the most effective; Tokyo can reasonably question
the efficacy of any sanctions package that does not include China. Also, remaining
within the UN framework demonstrates Japanese loyalty to international
institutions and law -- crucial given regional concerns about Japanese military
resurgence. Indeed, Ozawa said that should Japan act outside the UN, "I am deeply
afraid...that the international community would lose trust in Japan." 53 Moreover,
with the sanctions debate conducted in the UN, a failure to see them enacted would
be blamed on China rather than Japan. Given China's announced opposition to
sanctions, by forcing the issue to remain in the context of the Security Council,
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Tokyo shifts the spotlight to China, rather than itself, as a self-preoccupied, would-be
international player.
UN-approved sanctions would lessen many of the problems associated with
an ad hoc sanctions package. Lisa Martin notes, "In coercion cases institutions can
facilitate the issue linkages that the leading sender will have to use in order to
convince others to cooperate...raising the costs of defection." 54 Within Japan, any
political costs associated with confronting Chosensoren cannot be compared to those
resulting from going against the UN. Japan's concerns about other risks of enacting
sanctions would be mollified by the international approbation conferred upon UN
activities.
Japan should not fear retaliation from the DPRK for its participation in UN
sanctions. Pyongyang is unlikely to single out Japan for terrorist reprisals given the
number of other countries that would be participating. The DPRK has an interest in
maintaining good relations with Japan; Tokyo has agreed to provide the DPRK with
300,000 tons of rice (half of it free of charge), in response to Pyongyang's admittance
of a food shortage and request for aid.55 Such gifts would hardly be forthcoming in
the event of terrorism against Japan. Most importantly, the DPRK is keenly
interested in normalizing relations with Tokyo; it is only after diplomatic relations
are effected that Tokyo is willing to discuss the issue of reparations to the DPRK,
reparations that would provide Pyongyang with a large and much-needed source of
hard currency. It is thus in Pyongyang's interest to pursue policies that would
expedite rather than delay such negotiations.
For these reasons the U.S. should count on Japanese support for UN
sanctions measures against the DPRK, but should not expect Tokyo's participation
in ad hoc sanctions with itself and the ROK. The Clinton administration has
recognized this; in April 1995 officials met with a group of regional scholars who,
doubting the viability of the sanctions option, suggested that they "pursue more
subtle tactics, such as persuading China, Russia, and Japan to lean on Pyongyang." 5 6
Although the administration quickly pointed out that the experts "don't speak for
the government and don't make policy," 57 its consideration of measures other than
sanctions indicates that policy makers are aware of the difficulties in forming a
viable strategy for pressuring the DPRK in case the Agreed Framework breaks down.
1Russia was another major supplier of oil to the DPRK, until Moscow began demanding hard currency in payment for
its exports in 1991. China now supplies the DPRK with 80% of its oil. Source: South Korean News Agency, April 19,
1993.
2Robert A. Scalapino, "The Major Powers and the Korean Peninsula," The Korean Journal of National Unification 3
(1994), p. 21.
3 Teruaki Ueno, "Pro-Pyongyang Group Protests Japan Sanction Threat," Reuters North American Wire, June 6, 1994.
4 Jocelyn Ford, Japan Economic Newswire, November 17, 1989.
5 Chongryon, in Korean. An estimated 300,000 ethnic Koreans living in Japan support North Korea. (The Los Angeles
Times, December 16, 1993, p. A6). The others are members of Mindan, the pro-ROK organization, or are unaffiliated.
6 Personal interview, Kang Gwang Chu, International Department of Osaka Headquarters of Chosensoren. August 7, 1995.
7Introduction, Kitachosen no Kenkyu: Anata no tonari no kitachosen [A Study of North Korea: your next-door North
Korea], special edition No. 221 of Takarajima journal (Tokyo, Takarajima, April 1995). Quotation translated by the author
and R. Suzuki.
8 The New York Times, November 1, 1993, p. A12.
9
·-3ar-r --·-- --- ·--
9Ok Sung Soo, "Chosensoren wa nani o yattekita no ka?" [What has Chosensoren done?]Kitachosen no Kenkyu: Anata no
tonari no kitachosen, p. 43.
10 Teruaki Ueno, "Hundreds of North Korean Spies in Japan, Source Says," Reuters News Service, June 9, 1994.11 Pachinko is a game similar to pinball. Although gambling is illegal in Japan, winners receive prizes that may be
legally exchanged by a third party for cash. Unsurprisingly, the pachinko industry is rife with rumors of connections
to money laundering and organized crime. Ethnic Koreans also comprise large numbers of the Japanese yakuza.
12The Nikkei Weekly, February 27, 1995. The pachinko industry's statistics are as murky as any about North Korea;
Other estimates of this cash industry cite annual revenues of $300 billion (The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1993,
.A10).Charles Smith, "Pachinko Payola," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 19,1989, p. 25.
14 Personal Interview, Kang Gwang Chu, Chosensoren.
15 Quentin Hardy, The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1994, p. A10.
16 David Sanger, The New York Times, June 14, 1994, p. A12.
17Teruaki Ueno, June 6, 1994.
18 There is precedent to think that smuggling is occurring between Japan and the DPRK. Katsumi Sato writes of several
incidents, including one in 1988 when Chosensoren "tried to send 27 boxes of "clothing" to relatives living in North
Korea via the North Korean-registered ship "Samjiyon." The boxes had false bottoms and contained items violating
COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Control) regulations." Source: "Japanese Components and Yen Produced
North Korean Nuclear Weapons," excerpted from Katsumi Sato, Kitachosen Han no Kaku Senryaku (Tokyo: Kobunsha,
1993).
1 9The New York Times, June 14, 1994, p. A12.
20 The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1994, p. A10.
2 1Sato, p.13.
22Ibid.
23 Personal Interview, Kim Jyom Sok, Director, International Department of Osaka Headquarters, Chosensoren. August 7,
1995. Quotation translated by the author.
24 Korean Central News Agency, February 15,1994.
25According to Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in U.S. Congressional testimony. (The Los
Angeles Times, December 1, 1993). Multiplying the number of ferry travelers by the maximum travel allowance yields
a figure of about $750 million in current dollars. This method, however, is misleading. Ferry passengers are not
searched; it is likely some take a good deal more, and some a good deal less, than this rule allows. This figure also
ignores the activity of the 18 banks in Tokyo that routinely transfer money to Pyongyang (estimated by the Japanese
government to send $100 million a year), and the unknown number of transfers via third countries.6 CIA World Factbook (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, October 20, 1994).
2 7Ibid.
2 8 Quoted in Reji Yoshida, "Defense Paper Clear on Uncertainties," The Japan Times Weekly National Edition, July 10-
16, 1995, p.3 .
2 9See Lisa Martin, Coercive Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), and Kenneth Oye, ed.
Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
30 Eiichi Katahara, "Japan's Changing Political and Security Role," Pacific Strategic Paper 5 (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p.18
31 David Sanger, The New York Times, June 9, 1994.
3 2Teruaki Ueno, June 9, 1994.
3 3Ibid.
3 4David Hamilton, The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1994, p. A6.3 5Richard Lawless, "Tokyo's Ties to Pyongyang's Threat," The Wall Street Journal, December 28,1993, p. A10.
3 6Chung-in Moon, "The Political Economy of Security on the Korean Peninsula in the Regional Context," in Andrew
Mack, ed., Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula (St. Leonard's, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993),
p.132.
3David Arase, "New Directions in Japanese Security Policy," in Colin McInnes and Mark G. Rolls, eds., "Post-Cold
War Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region," Contemporary Security Policy 15:2 (August 1994), p. 48.
38 Personal Interview, Takeo Mori, Deputy Director, Northeast Asia Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
August 28, 1995. Quotation translated by the author and R. Suzuki.
39 Masao Okonogi, "An Uncertain Ten Years: North Korea's Experiment for Survival and the Preferred Policy of Japan,"
p.7. Presented at the Symposium on North Korea and Prospects for Korean Unification, University of California, San
Diego, La Jolla, CA, May 25-27, 1995.
40 David Hamilton, The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1994, p. A6.
41 Teruaki Ueno, June 6, 1994.
4 2David Sanger, The New York Times, June 9, 1994, p. 1.
4 3Andrew Mack, "Nuclear End-Game on the Korean Peninsula," in Marianne van Leeuwen, ed., The Future of the
10
X 
-
International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (Dordrect: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), p. 21.
4 4 ersonal Interview, Takeo Mori, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4 5Robert A. Scalapino, "North Korean Relations with Japan and the United States," in Robert Scalapino and Jun-yop
Kim, eds., North Korea Today; Strategic and Donmestic Issues (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California, 1983), p. .340.
4 6Charles Smith, "Pachinko Payola," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 19, 1989, p. 25.
4 7Jocelyn Ford, "Pinball Scandal is High-Risk Gamble for Politics," Japan Economic Newswire, November 2, 1989.
4 8Teresa Watanabe, "Japan Called Conduit for N. Korea's Military Program," The Los Angeles Times, December 16,
1993, p. A6.
4 9Shoichi Oikawa, The Daily Yomiuri, December 6, 1994, p.6.
5 0Teresa Watanabe, The Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1993, p. A6.
5 1quoted in The Los Angeles Times, June 15, 1994, p. A6.
5 2Ibid.
5 3Ibid.
5 4 Lisa Martin, p.39.
5 5The Japan Times, July 1, 1995, p. 1.
5 6Steve Glain, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1994.
5 7Ibid.
11
-------· -
